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Who Bears What Risk? An Intergenerational Perspective
Abstract
Many governments promise pension and medical benefits to their elderly citizens. As the world is aging,
the burden of retiree benefits is becoming painfully obvious. Uncertainty about the future makes planning
for retiree benefits even more difficult. Who will suffer or gain financially if the future differs from what we
expect? For example, we face tremendous uncertainty about the speed of technical progress, about
medical costs, and about trends in fertility and longevity. Government policy determines not only the level
of taxes and benefits, but also who bears the risk of unexpected changes. Traditionally, retirement
programs largely exempted retirees from sharing risk: by making fixed, unconditional, promises, they
necessarily imposed a more-than-proportional risk on younger cohorts and on future generations. We
examine the impact of alternative tax, pension, and health care policies on different cohorts, to evaluate
how existing policies shift risk across cohorts. We also assess whether there may be conditions under
which such policies might be appropriate in the interest of general welfare, and where there may be scope
for better policies. The analysis covers the fundamental sources of risk: productivity, fertility, longevity,
health, and assets
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Chapter 2
Who Bears What Risk? An Intergenerational
Perspective
Henning Bohn

Governments in most developed countries promise pension and medical
benefits to their elderly citizens. As the number of retirees is growing
rapidly, the burden of retiree benefits has become painfully obvious. Uncertainty about the future complicates the planning for retiree benefits. If
the future is brighter than expected, who will reap the gains? If it is worse,
who will cover the added cost?
This chapter examines the impact of uncertainty on different cohorts at
an aggregate or macroeconomic level. Macroeconomic analysis helps evaluate different risks and the policies affecting them in context, and it also
enforces a consistent recognition that society as a whole faces an uncertain
future and must bear the resulting financial risks. These risks include a
tremendous uncertainty about the future path of technical progress, medical innovations, and trends in fertility and longevity—risks so huge that
common stock market risks are small in comparison. Tax, pension, and
health care policies have a major impact on who bears these risks.
Risk-sharing is instructive as a general perspective on public policy because it avoids divisive battles about redistribution. Everyone is better off if
risks are shared. Risk should be seen as a symmetric chance of outcomes
better or worse than expected. Furthermore, economic risks are often
compensated by gains in expectation, creating interesting risk-return
trade-offs. The key challenge for economic policy is therefore not to
minimize risks, but to allocate risks to those best able to bear them. If
risk-taking is rewarded in the market, a related challenge is to maintain
incentives for risk-taking and to focus policy interventions into areas where
markets fail. Once actual outcomes are observed, however, public policy is
inevitably a battle between known winners and known losers, leaving little
scope for disinterested economic analysis. Risk-sharing is not only a natural
perspective looking forward—a search for mutually beneficial insurance
arrangements—but equally instructive looking back: to what extent can
existing social institutions be explained as solving risk-sharing problems?
Intergenerational risk-sharing is fertile ground for finding market failures because future generations are naturally excluded from insurance

2 / Who Bears What Risk? Intergenerational Perspective

11

markets. Welfare improvements are possible because a government’s
power of taxation gives it a unique ability to make commitments on behalf
of future generations. Fiscal institutions such as social security and Medicare formalize such commitments. The government’s power to oblige
future generations also creates potential for abuse. Risks might be shifted
haphazardly onto future generations by governments catering to current
voters. The merits of government intervention are therefore an open
question—a question inviting economic analysis.
In this chapter, we first identify the key issues and mechanisms of risksharing and illustrate them with policy examples. Next we examine
three major risk factors: (a) macroeconomic risks, particularly uncertain
productivity growth and uncertain asset values; (b) demographic risks,
due to uncertain fertility and longevity; and (c) medical expense risks, due
to uncertain health care needs and cost. For each risk factor, allocations of
risk under current and proposed policies are compared to efficient risksharing and to a laissez-faire allocation.

Aggregate and Generational Risks
The future rarely unfolds as expected. Over the typical life cycle, individuals
face uncertainty about earnings and job prospects, their health and family
status, the return on their savings, and ultimately about the time and manner
of their deaths. Some of these risks imply financial burdens that add up
across cohorts and over time—driven by macroeconomic disturbances—
while other risks wash out.
On a macroeconomic level, uncertainty about earnings and the returns
on saving have common roots, namely uncertainty about technological
progress that determines factor productivity and asset values, as well as
uncertainty about demographic developments that determine the supply
of labor relative to capital. In turn, demographic uncertainty can be attributed to more fundamental shifts in fertility, longevity, and health (e.g.
disability). Health and mortality can perhaps be traced to even more
fundamental factors such as innovations in medical technology.
Tracing risks to their fundamental sources is most easily done at an
aggregate level to avoid the confounding effects of idiosyncratic noise.
Tracing risks is important for economic and policy analysis because common sources of risk create positive correlations that make risk-sharing
difficult. Because individuals are exposed to different sources of risk as
they age, it is instructive to aggregate risks by cohort (birth year) or by
generation (a collection of cohorts). Risks that remain significant for an
entire generation are essentially macroeconomic. Such risks are more
difficult to manage than idiosyncratic risks because they may not cancel
out. Risk-sharing is nonetheless promising because different generations
are often exposed unequally to the various sources of aggregate risk.
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Managing Aggregate Risks
Three main mechanisms exist for managing aggregate risks: markets, families, and governmental fiscal policy. Financial markets and insurance markets have serious limitations with regard to aggregate risks. In practice,
markets work well for sharing many short-term risks between cohorts with
largely overlapping lifetimes. However, they cannot provide insurance when
there is a very large age difference between cohorts, one large enough so
that the older cohort’s life risks are largely known, when the younger
cohort arrives. In aggregate, the insurance industry is ‘owned’ by the same
generation of savers for which the industry provides insurance. Similarly,
corporate pension promises are made by firms that are collectively owned by
cohorts as they approach retirement. Consequently, neither insurance
policies nor private pensions can provide significant protection against
aggregate risks.
The most promising venue for private risk-sharing is probably intergenerational risk-sharing, at least, if risks are defined at the national level.
Intergenerational risk-sharing has been puzzlingly ineffective in practice,
however. Saving has historically flowed mostly into domestic investment.
Investment portfolios are strongly biased toward domestic securities. The
analysis later will therefore take mostly a closed-economy perspective, as
appropriate in a world with strong home bias.
A second mechanism is intrafamily exchange and altruism, as expressed
through bequests and inter vivo gifts. In theory, altruism can fully solve all
risk-sharing problems, especially if combined with an intracohort sharing
of idiosyncratic risk. As shown by Barro (1974), the Ricardian neutrality
proposition has dynastic families behaving like a single infinitely lived
economic agent, making generational issues moot.1 Empirically, however,
risk-sharing within families is highly imperfect, as documented by Altonji
et al. (1996). Parental altruism toward children is undoubtedly an important explanation for education expenditures, but overall the life-cycle
model is a good first approximation for individual behavior. Risk-shifting
through bequests may nonetheless occur ‘accidentally’, if mortality is uncertain and assets are not annuitized.
The third risk-sharing mechanism is fiscal policy, via social insurance
programs, general taxes and transfers, and through public debt. The most
important international risk-sharing programs in the USA are social security old-age benefits and retiree medical insurance (known as Medicare and
Medicaid). Public debt also plays an equivalent role for intergenerational
redistribution, as it tends to be refinanced repeatedly and passed on to
future generation just like pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) pensions. In this setting,
taxes are a general purpose risk-sharing device: they socialize the tax share
of whatever tax base they are imposed on. Particularly important in the
generational context are consumption taxes and capital income taxes; the
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latter broadly construed to include taxes on saving, including individual
interest, dividend, and capital gains income, corporate income, and on real
property.
Economists have shown that fiscal risk-sharing is sometimes constrained
by tax distortions, as the excess tax burden grows more than proportionally
as labor income tax rates rise. Because risk-sharing leaves taxes rates unchanged on average, distortionary taxes per se are not an issue. Also not at
issue are capital income taxes: if stochastic capital income is to be taxed for
risk-sharing purposes, saving distortions can be avoided by compensating
up-front incentives. A convex excess burden does imply a welfare loss, if
risk-sharing calls for variations in labor income tax rates. This is conceptually an enforcement problem inherent in all insurance. After an insured
event occurs, one or the other party must be forced to pay up. For intergenerational risk-sharing, convexity means that payments are more costly
to collect from future generations than they are to disburse. The welfare
impact is roughly proportional to the labor supply elasticity and could be
minimized by collecting risk-sharing related taxes at times in the life cycles
where labor supply elasticities are small. The distortion issue is noted later
where relevant.

Three Policy Examples
Examples are instructive to illustrate the role of policy and to convey two
key points. First, none of the risk-sharing mechanisms can eliminate the
underlying risks. Therefore, one should be skeptical of policies offering
safety to some group, without disclosing who is supposed to provide the
guarantees. Second, details matter. Risk-bearing is often determined by
subtle features of economic institutions that are often ill-defined or poorly
understood.
Who Ensures That Social Security Is Safe? Social security—by which we
mean old-age benefit programs—are known to experience recurrent
financial problems, which are mainly attributable to the contradictory
way in which such programs account for risk. Benefits tend to be set—in
the defined benefit (DB) world at least—according to a fixed formula. In
the USA, payroll tax rates are also supposed to be constant, but even if
budgets initially balance, the risk profiles of benefits and taxes are
inconsistent. Consequently, benefits and taxes are bound to drift out of
balance if the economy does not grow exactly as expected, or if
demographic trends fail to exactly match expectations. Honest planning
should acknowledge that either tax rates or benefits must vary in response
to economic and demographic disturbances.
In the reform milieu, two paradigmatic structures can be envisioned: a
DB model, which will inevitably entail variable taxes to pay the set benefits

14

Henning Bohn

or a Defined Contribution (DC) model, which entails variable benefits. DB
and DC are instructive points of reference (used later) because more
complicated transfer systems are conveniently characterized by how they
compare to DB and DC.
For the US social security system, which is a DB model, having a Trust
Fund has complicated an assessment of the system’s risk-sharing structure.
Having the Trust Fund does help smooth temporary fluctuations in revenues and benefits, but it cannot solve the deeper problem of uncertainty.
In 1983, Alan Greenspan’s Commission to reform social security raised
taxes and reduced benefit growth rates, apparently believing that building
up a surplus in the Trust Fund would fix the system’s uncertainties. Nevertheless, even if true in expectation, the fix was bound to fail in practice.
Since 1983, the Trust Fund and the resulting chaos in federal accounting
(Trust Fund accounting conflicts with national Unified Budgeting) have
obscured the fact that policymakers have not addressed the key questions
of whether social security should be seen as a DB or a DC system, or
something in between.
If social security is viewed as a DB model, then it is reasonable to think of
it as creating ‘safe’ claims; in other words, it entails an unconditional
obligation on future generations to finance promised benefits. To honor
this obligation, tax rates will have to rise whenever payrolls grow less than
expected, and vice versa. By contrast, if it were seen as a DC model, social
security benefits would be contingent claims worth as much (or as little) as
the payroll tax revenue dedicated to them. Either way, future benefits
payable and taxes collected are influenced by a multitude of economic
and demographic disturbances.
The DB versus DC question is crucial for those who expect to live off
social security in old age, but there is little agreement over which is the
right interpretation. US political rhetoric for many years supported the DB
view, but more recently the government has adopted more of a DC perspective, as seen in social security statements warning of benefit cuts when
the Trust Fund is exhausted. If widely accepted, this new view would have a
major impact on risk-sharing in the USA, as it would expose retirees to
additional risk of future economic and demographic changes. If increases
in payroll taxes are deemed to be politically infeasible, this supports the DC
interpretation. We examine both interpretations in later subsections.
What Are the Risk-Sharing Implications of Social Security Reform? The
policy debate over whether to hold equity investments in social security
illustrates some of the risk-sharing implications of seemingly minor
differences in program design (Bohn 1999). For instance, consider two
alternative proposals: permitting workers to convert part of their social
security taxes to a DC-type individual account, as suggested by the 2001
Presidential Commission, versus the Clinton administration’s plan, which
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proposed to invest part of the Trust Fund in the stock market while
maintaining a DB promise. The individual accounts approach reduces
risk-sharing, scaling down the traditional system proportionally. Under
the Clinton plan, by contrast, equities in the Trust Fund are effectively
owned by future tax payers, so equity risk is shifted across generations.
Now consider two modifications that might be thought of as relatively
modest. First, suppose the individual accounts were combined with a
minimum-return guarantee. Financial economists know that a return guarantee is economically equivalent to a put option on the stock market, which
in turn is equivalent to a transfer of fractional ownership to future generations which back the guarantee (Smetters 2001). In this sense, an individual account plan with a guarantee has remarkably similar risk-sharing
implications to the Clinton plan. Furthermore, the put option argument
applies even without explicit guarantees, if those who earn low returns in
their individual accounts would be eligible for welfare benefits.
As a second example, consider the Clinton approach to equity investments in the Trust Fund, but now with a DC view of social security where
gains and losses in the Trust Fund would accrue to retirees. Clearly, the
risk-sharing implications are equivalent to nonguaranteed individual accounts: no intergenerational risk-shifting. Trust Fund investments rule out
individual debt-equity choices, of course. Even this microeconomic difference vanishes if individual accounts are restricted to a single index fund.
In summary, the risk-sharing implications of equity investment proposals
depend on the specifics. Individual account plans imply very little effective
ownership if accompanied by guarantees or by means-tested supplemental
supports. Conversely, having the Trust Fund diversify its investments has
very different risk consequences, depending on whether the system is seen
as a DB versus a DC plan.
Who Bears the Financial Risks of Medicare? In the USA, retiree medical
benefit promises have traditionally been presented as a categorical
commitment, just like social security. Retiree Hospital Insurance (HI,
known as Medicare Part A) is financed by the same payroll-tax
mechanism as are old-age benefits. Medicare is of interest because of two
important complications: substantial uncertainty about medical expenses
and the cost-sharing structure embedded in the Supplemental Medical
Insurance plan (SMI, known as Medicare Part B and Part D). If Medicare
benefits are seen to be a promise to ‘cover all medical needs’, then it
follows that the system can be interpreted as a DB plan with less
predictable costs than the old-age social security system. In this view,
benefits are contingent on the uncertain cost of existing treatments
and contingent on medical discoveries that may vastly increase
beneficiaries’ perceived needs. Both create what I will call medical-expense
risk. Cost projections under this DB interpretation are enormous and
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highly sensitive to alternative assumptions. Clearly, this interpretation
exposes future generations to substantial risks, to be examined in more
detail later.
Cost-sharing in SMI complicates the assessment, as SMI has always required retiree contributions, and there is a history of cost-shifting between
HI and SMI. To the extent that rising health costs could be shifted to SMI,
retirees will retain some of the aggregate medical-expense risk. On the
other hand, most SMI coverage is financed from general tax revenues, and
many retirees have limited income. As long as medical care in retirement is
viewed as entitlement, medical-expense risk is thus largely carried by future
generations.
This allocation of risk would be reversed completely if aggregate expenditures were capped. For example, Kotlikoff and Burns (2004) propose that
Medicare be converted into a voucher program subsidizing individual
insurance purchases. They argue, somewhat misleadingly, that vouchers
provide full insurance and are sensitive to preexisting conditions. But a key
assumption in their approach is that vouchers increase in value no
faster than the growth rate of wages; if aggregate medical expenses
rose faster, the vouchers would cover a declining share of each retiree’s
medical expenses. A capped voucher system therefore places aggregate
medical-expense risk onto the retiree generation.
These examples illustrate how program rules determine the allocation of
risk within and across generations. The lesson is clear—there is no free
lunch. With proper accounting, governments cannot make macroeconomic risks vanish; instead, the risk is simply reallocated. The observation
leads to the next question: how should society allocate aggregate risks?

A Benchmark: Equal Risk-Sharing
A natural benchmark for risk-sharing is the proportionate pooling of risk.
Everyone bears the impact of any conceivable good or bad economic
outcome in proportion to his normal consumption opportunities. Riskpooling is the unique efficient allocation if everyone has the same relative
risk aversion. If risks were allocated differently, individuals with aboveaverage risk exposure would be willing to pay a higher price for riskreduction than individuals with below-average exposure. Unequal risk
exposures are therefore indicators of economic inefficiency.
Risk-pooling provides a clear guideline for policy and a roadmap for
economic analysis. To improve welfare, policy should shift risks from
cohorts more exposed to a given source of risk to those initially less
exposed. To find policy improvements, one must assess who bears how
much of each risk in the market, how the risks would be allocated with
efficient sharing, and then compare the market allocation with the efficient
allocation.
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Two clarifications and two caveats are in order. First, efficient policy
regarding risk-bearing and risk-sharing should focus on consumption (or
more precisely, the marginal utility thereof) and not income. Because labor
supply and savings opportunities differ across cohorts, consumption pooling usually entails unequal exposures to income risk. Second, risks can be
shared with future generations by variations in capital accumulation. Most
economic disturbances therefore trigger consumption responses in current and future periods. Efficiency requires that retiree consumption and
working-age consumption respond equally in every period, usually with
declining amplitude over time.
The first caveat is to emphasize that aggregate risks have a market price.
In finance terms, aggregate risks are systematic risks. On financial markets,
securities with systematic risk trade at a discount to safe assets, or equivalently, they promise an expected return above the safe interest rate. The
same principle applies to aggregate risks that are reallocated through fiscal
policy and may be nontradable. To make everyone better off, a policy must
offer compensation to those required to bear more risk—a risk premium.
The acid test for a welfare-improving policy is that those relieved of risks are
better off after paying the risk premium. Unfortunately, economic theory
has trouble explaining empirically observed risk premiums, notably the
equity premium. While risk pooling provides a straightforward benchmark
for how risk should be allocated, the magnitude of the compensation is
sometimes difficult to determine.
The second caveat is that risk exposures must be adjusted if individuals
differ in their intrinsic risk aversion. Less risk-averse individuals demand a
lower price for bearing risk and should bear more risk in an efficient
allocation. The literature on habit formation suggests that older people,
the retiree cohort, may be more risk-averse than younger, working-age
individuals. Later I will return to this caveat.
In any case, efficient risk-sharing has implications that are robust to
differential risk aversion. Most importantly, for economic efficiency, everyone would have to be exposed to aggregate risk in the same direction. If a
disturbance hit only working-age cohorts, or only retirees, or both generations in opposite directions, risk-sharing is always inefficient. Moreover, if
one cohort is more risk-averse than another, it should be proportionately
less exposed to all types of risk, yielding testable restrictions in a world with
many sources of risk.

A Tractable Analytic Framework
The risk-pooling principle has most power if applied across multiple risks.
Because examining and aggregating the joint effects of all the various risks
on different cohorts is not an easy task, it is instructive to take a stylized
perspective on work and asset accumulation over the life cycle to see how

18

Henning Bohn

the principle can be evaluated. The classic Diamond (1965) two-period
overlapping-generations (OG) model provides a convenient framework.
In the Diamond model, all cohorts in the workforce are grouped together into a single working-age generation, and all retirees are treated as a
single retiree generation. Children are attached to their parents’ households. Changes in longevity can be modeled as changes in the relative
length of working-age and retirement. While this description of the life
cycle is clearly simplified, it helps highlight key elements of intergenerational risk-sharing without getting lost in the minutiae of how individuals
lead their lives. Incomes during the working-age period are mainly wage
incomes; wages after taxes are divided between consumption and saving.
Saving is invested in financial markets, and it ends up financing either
domestic capital accumulation, government bonds, or investments abroad.
Income for the retiree generation is from capital and other assets. Retirees
use asset income, asset sales, and transfers from the government to finance
retirement consumption, medical care, and (perhaps) bequests.2
What can this framework tell us about who bears what risks? The following sections will examine each of the major risks.

Aggregate Risks (I): Macroeconomic Risks
Uncertain Productivity Growth. Productivity growth is quantitatively the
most important source of long-run economic uncertainty. With 1 percent
annual productivity growth for a generation, for example, our children will
earn 35 percent higher incomes (compounding 1 percent for 30 years),
and our grandchildren 80 percent more. With 3 percent annual
productivity growth, our children would instead earn 140 percent more
and our grandchildren almost 500 percent more. Without productivity
growth, per capita incomes would stagnate. The 0–3 percent range falls
well within the range growth rates experienced around the world.
Who bears the risk of such growth uncertainty? Because labor and capital
shares in national income are essentially constant, growth uncertainty has
an equal impact on wages earned by working-age households and on
capital incomes earned by retirees. But equal income effects do not imply
equal consumption effects; there are three main issues to consider. First,
the retiree generation owns not only the earnings but also the principal
value of accumulated real and financial assets. Because asset values are less
sensitive to growth than earnings (see later), existing assets reduce retiree
generation’s exposure to productivity risk, leaving workers relatively more
exposed. Second, government transfers and taxes augment retiree incomes
at the expense of working cohorts’ incomes. Because net transfers tend to
be less sensitive to growth than wages and capital incomes, fiscal policy
further reduces retiree exposure to productivity risk while increasing working cohorts’ exposure. Third, the working-age generation may respond to
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unexpectedly high or low productivity by altering its saving rate and work
hours. The study of labor supply and savings responses is unfortunately
complicated because several income and substitution effects interact. In
Bohn (2004), I show that savings and labor supply responses tend to further
magnify the impact of productivity shock on working-age consumption.
Key distinctions must be made between income and productivity shocks
and between temporary and permanent shocks. Negative income shocks can
be absorbed by working more; however, negative productivity shocks reduce
not only income but also the hourly wage, which makes a productivity
slump an inefficient time to work more. Having variable labor supply
therefore does not enable working cohorts to bear more productivity risk.
The permanence of shocks matters because the young can absorb temporary shocks by consumption-smoothing over the life cycle. A change
in productivity growth is, however, a permanent disturbance to the economy’s productivity level, which rules out consumption smoothing.3 The
permanence of shocks also matters because high future productivity raises
interest rates, which has income and substitution effects. Assuming a low
elasticity of substitution (consistent with empirical estimates), high-productivity growth reduces the savings rate and therefore magnifies the impact
of productivity shocks on working-age consumption.
Overall, the OG approach yields an unambiguous conclusion: working-age
individuals are more exposed to productivity risk than retirees. This result may
seem to conflict with the notion that capital incomes are more risky than
wage incomes. There is no conflict, however, if one properly distinguishes
productivity risk from asset valuation risk—to be examined next.
Uncertain Asset Values. Returns to capital are subject to a second source
of risk, namely the uncertainty about the price at which seasoned capital
can be sold to the next generation. This topic includes the much-discussed
stock market and housing market risks. Because asset valuation risk falls
primarily on the retiree generation, retiree incomes can be more volatile
than working-age incomes.
The main social mechanisms for sharing such valuation risk include capital
income taxation and bequests. Capital income taxes yield return-contingent
government receipts that reduce the need for taxes on future generations.
This gives future generations an exposure to the current return on capital.
Income taxes unfortunately reduce saving incentives. One policy response in
the USA has been to provide savings incentives up-front and fully tax the
returns, as exemplified in 401(k) and 403(b) plans and traditional IRAs.
Another policy response has been to tax capital gains and dividends at reduced
rate, or to exempt capital income entirely (e.g. Roth IRAs). The distinction is
important because risks are shared in proportion to the marginal tax rate. A tax
system with taxed returns and up-front incentives provides much more risksharing than tax-exempt savings.4 The other important mechanism is
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bequests. For risk-sharing purposes, bequests are equivalent to a self-imposed
capital income tax that benefits future generations.
Evidence on Productivity and Valuation Risks. Empirical evidence is
consistent with wage income being relatively more exposed to
productivity risk than capital income. I have computed 30-year-ahead
‘generational’ covariance matrices from annual 1875–2002 US gross
domestic product (GDP) data and S&P500 prices and dividends (Bohn
2004). Here I find a generational standard deviation for GDP of sY ¼ 35
percent, a 64 percent standard deviation for equity returns, and a
41 percent correlation between the 30-year-ahead forecast errors.5 If
one interprets the data in terms of a Cobb–Douglas aggregate production
function, the standard deviations of wages and productivity equal
the standard deviation of GDP. If capital is financed with equity
and debt (about 26 percent debt) and debt is essentially safe, the
standard deviation of capital (R k ) can be determined to be
sR k ¼ (1  0:26)  0:64 ¼ 47 percent. One may also decompose the
return on capital into a GDP factor, plus an orthogonal asset valuation
factor (V), R k ¼ p  Y þ V . The above estimates
implyﬃ a factor loading of
qﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
p
^ ¼ cov(Y ,R k )=var(Y ) ¼ 0:58 and sV ¼ s2R k  p
^ 2 s2Y ¼ 43 percent.
Even my long data-set covers only a small number of nonoverlapping
generational periods. The generational variances and covariances are
therefore best viewed as point estimates subject to substantial specification
uncertainty.6 It is nonetheless reassuring that the estimates match economic theory quite well. Notably:

(1) The factor loading below one indicates that capital returns are less
exposed to productivity risk than output and wages—about 58 percent as much.
(2) The inequality sR k > sY confirms the conventional wisdom that
returns on capital investment are more volatile than wages.
Note that these estimates are also consistent with productivity uncertainty
as the dominant source of consumption risk at long horizons, especially
looking several generations ahead. This is because future generations bear
valuation risk for a limited number of years, between work and retirement,
whereas their exposure to productivity risk grows with the forecast horizon.
The differences in riskiness between retiree and working-age incomes
are promising for intergenerational risk-sharing. They suggest that working-age cohorts benefit from shifting productivity risk to retirees, while
retirees benefit from shifting asset pricing risks to subsequent generations.
Linking Income to Consumption: A Quantitative Analysis. Quantitative
insights about the efficiency of risk-sharing can be obtained by combining
the data with a calibrated version of the OG model. Table 2-1, which builds
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Table 2-1 Productivity and Asset Pricing Risks
Scenarios (Responses to unexpected changes in percent)
Laissez- Laissez- Efficient Calibrated
faire
faire with solution policy
bequests
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel 1A: Higher productivity (35 %)
Consumption
26
26
in retirement
Consumption
36
35
in working age
Disp. Income
35
34
in working age
32
31
Capital
investment
Panel 1B: Higher asset values (40 %)
Consumption
40
40
in retirement
Consumption
0
4
in working age
0
4
Disp. Income
in working age
Capital investment 0
5

All safe
More taxes
transfers
and
wage-indexing
(5)
(6)

34

25

28

17

34

37

35

41

30

35

33

39

23

31

29

37

13

27

21

27

13

7

10

7

16

8

11

8

22

10

14

10

Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: Columns refer to different policy scenarios, as follows.
Col. 1: Basic overlapping generations economy without government and no bequests.
Col. 2: Like Col. 1 with accidental bequests.
Col. 3: Responses with efficient risk-sharing. (Key characteristic: Equal consumption
responses.)
Col. 4: Economy calibrated to US data and fiscal institutions: partially wage-indexed
social security, defined-benefits public health, safe public debt, capital income taxes
with 15 percent marginal rate.
Col. 5: All transfers wage-indexed, public debt wage- or GDP-indexed, capital income
tax with 30 percent marginal rate, otherwise like Col. 4.
Col. 6: All transfers inflation-indexed, otherwise like Col. 4.

on Bohn (2001, 2004), shows how differential income risks translate into
unequal consumption exposures.7 Each column presents the risk-sharing
implications of a different policy scenario. Entries in Panel A show
percentage responses in both generations’ consumption, in working-age
income, and in capital investment to an unexpected 35 percent increase in
productivity growth. The 35 percent change can be interpreted as
generational standard deviation or as 1 percent per year compounded for
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30 years. Panel B shows responses to an unexpected 40 percent increase in
asset values, also about a standard deviation.
The responses are symmetric and scalable. Negative disturbances would
have the reverse effects; smaller or greater shocks would have proportionally smaller or greater impact. The percentage values can therefore be
interpreted as exposures to risk. They can be used contemporaneously to
assess the efficiency of risk-sharing between current retirees and current
workers, or prospectively to examine risk-sharing between future retirees
(current workers) and future workers (current children and unborn).
Column 1 shows the allocation of risk in a laissez-faire economy without
bequests. Higher productivity raises working-age consumption, incomes,
and capital investment by about as much as productivity (35 percent), but
retirement consumption by substantially less (26 percent). Unexpectedly
high asset values affect only retirees. Column 2 adds bequests to the laissezfaire economy, specifically that 20 percent of retiree resources are
bequeathed to working-age cohorts.8 Retirees remain exposed to the
same risks as before, but working-age cohorts bear a little valuation risk.
The more diversified income slightly reduces working-age exposure to
productivity risk. Column 3 shows the allocation one would obtain with
perfectly pooled risk. Retiree and working-age consumption would respond equally to both shocks. Because savings respond more to productivity shocks than working-age consumption, disposable income in working
age should be less sensitive to productivity shocks than retiree income. The
efficient allocation of valuation risk cuts retirees exposure by more than
two-thirds, and it shares valuation risk with future generations through
substantial variations in investment. Column 4 adds a stylized representation of US fiscal institutions to the market economy with bequests. The
retiree generation receives partially wage-indexed, annuitized social security benefits: 5 percent of GDP on average, 50 percent wage-indexed to
proxy indexation to age 60. They receive medical benefits that are unresponsive to productivity risk: 3.5 percent of GDP. They pay income and
consumption taxes: 3.5 percent of GDP with 15 percent marginal rate; and
they hold safe government bonds: 2.5 percent of generational GDP.
The relative magnitudes of transfers and taxes match Auerbach et al.
(1999) generational accounts for age 65, rounded for simplicity.
If one compares the calibrated policy (Column 4) with laissez-faire
(Column 2) and with the efficient allocation (Column 3), one finds that
fiscal policy magnifies the generational gap between working-age and retiree exposure
to productivity risk. This is largely because public debt, medical benefits, and
social security (the nonwage-indexed part) provide safe claims to retirees.
While safe transfers reduces retiree exposure to risk, they force the government to collect fixed revenues from the next generation’s stochastic
wage income. This increases the relative risk exposure of working-age
cohorts. Policy also shifts valuation risk from retirees to workers, largely
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because of the capital income tax, but not as much as risk-pooling would
require.
Columns 5 and 6 illustrate the impact of alternative policies. Column 5
assumes fully wage-indexed transfers: a 30 percent (doubled) tax on capital
income, holding savings incentives and the generational account constant
through compensating transfers. Column 6 assumes that all retiree transfers are fixed in real terms. The allocation with wage-indexing and highermarginal tax rates is evidently closer to risk pooling than current policy,
whereas fixed benefits yield a more uneven allocation of productivity risk.
Overall, Table 2-1 demonstrates how fiscal policy influences risk-sharing and how it could improve the allocation of risk. Note that a better
sharing of productivity risk would make labor income taxes less variable
and therefore reduce the excess burden of taxation. Hence tax distortions
cannot explain the imperfect sharing of productivity risk. They may help
explain why valuation risk is not fully shared.
In general, the public policy debate is quite incoherent regarding how
much risk retirees should be expected to take. Two popular positions
which embody this conflict are those who would (a) encourage equity
investments in pensions and (b) provide guaranteed benefit promises.
Both positions are inconsistent with risk pooling. To justify (a), one
would have to consider retirees to be highly risk-tolerant, but in this case
retirees should bear much more productivity risk, contradicting (b). To
justify (b), one would have to view retirees as intrinsically more risk-averse
than younger individuals. This might justify fiscal institutions that provide
safe income to retirees, but it would argue strongly against pushing retirees
into equity investments. If retirees are about as risk-averse as younger
cohorts, welfare improvements can be found in the direction of more
wage- or GDP-indexing, either within social security or via GDP-indexed
public debt.9 Not all indexing is beneficial, however. For example, if
productivity shocks are negatively correlated with inflation, as evidence
suggests, inflation-indexed government debt yields less risk-sharing than
traditional nominal debt.10

Aggregate Risks (II): Demographics
Uncertain Fertility. It is clear that fertility changes can have major effects on
the economy and on intergenerational transfers: the baby-boom and babybust phenomena are prime examples. Unfortunately, the public pension
debate has mischaracterized the phenomenon by focusing on the fiscal
burden that falls more heavily on smaller cohorts than on larger ones.
Macroeconomic theory suggests that being born into a small cohort is
actually good news. When a small cohort enters the labor force, workers are
scarce and retirement saving from the preceding larger cohorts provides a
high capital–labor ratio. When small cohorts move toward retirement,
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subsequent larger cohorts provide the labor that allows retirement savings
to earn a high return. In a world without PAYGO transfers, risk-sharing
would therefore call for net transfers from small cohorts to larger ones. In a
world with PAYGO transfers, higher-payroll taxes on smaller cohorts can be
interpreted as risk-sharing—not as a fiscal problem, but as solution to a
demographic risk sharing problem.
Table 2-2 provides a quantitative assessment of who bears the risk of
variable cohort sizes. Panel A displays responses to an unexpected 15
percent decline in the labor force (about the decline between the baby
boom and baby bust: 79 million births in 1945–64 versus 69 million births
1965–84).11 Columns 1–6 display the allocation of risk for the same scenarios as in Table 2-1, with the clarification that transfers are of the DB
variety in Columns 4 and 5 but DC in Column 6. The laissez-faire allocations
Table 2-2 Demographic Risks: Fertility and Longevity
Scenarios (Responses to unexpected changes in percent)
LaissezLaissez- faire with Efficient Calibrated
faire
bequests solution policy
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

More taxes
and wage- All safe
indexing transfers
(5)
(6)

Panel 2A: Baby-bust decline in the workforce (15 %)
Consumption
7.9 7.9
0.1
4.2
2.1
in retirement
Consumption
4.0
4.4
0.1
2.2
1.2
in working age
Disp. income
4.5
4.8
0.1
2.5
1.4
in working-age
Capital
5.5
5.6
0.2
3.2
1.7
Investment
Panel 2B: Increased longevity (þ15 %)
Consumption
15.0 15.0 6.7
in retirement
Consumption
5.9 5.1 6.7
in working age
Disp. income
0.0
0.0 4.6
in working age
12.4
12.6
0.0
Capital
investment

7.6
3.9
4.4
5.6

11.6

8.6

15.0

6.3

6.5

6.0

1.9

3.5

0.0

7.7

3.0

13.0

Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: Same scenarios are as in Table 2-1. Panel A considers a 15 decline in
cohort size, roughly matching the US baby-boom to baby-bust transition. Panel B
assumes a 15 percent increase in the retirement period (about two years).
Transfers are annuitized defined benefits in Cols. 4 and 5, and defined contributions in Col. 6.
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illustrate the benefits of being in a small cohort (Columns 1 and 2). The
consumption of the retired ‘baby boom’ generation declines, whereas the
income and consumption of the working-age ‘baby bust’ generation rise.
Efficient risk-sharing calls for a slight increase in both generations’ consumption (Column 3), as permitted by a slight increase in per capita
income. The policy (Column 4) calibrated to resemble the US yields
consumption responses in the same opposing directions as laissez-faire.
The smaller absolute values indicate better risk-sharing. The policy alternative with more DB transfers (Column 5) provides more risk-pooling than
the calibrated policy, whereas the DC system (Column 6) provides virtually
no risk-sharing. In summary, a DB transfer help share demographic risk.
Empirical evidence on the effects of demographic risk is unfortunately
scarce. Evidence exists on the labor market, where the wage effects of a
variable cohort size are well documented (e.g. Welch 1979). Capital market
effects are difficult to document, perhaps because the start of retirement
savings is more variable cross-sectionally than a cohort’s entry into the labor
force. Capital market effects are also obscured by high asset price volatility
and perhaps by international capital flows. Population aging is a worldwide
phenomenon, however, so the scope for international diversification is
limited. Despite the scarcity of evidence, economic theory is probably a
better guide to the future than naive trend extrapolations that assume a
disconnect between demographic change and factor prices.
Uncertain Longevity. Around the world, mortality has long been on a
declining trend. The main intergenerational impact is on life expectancy
in retirement, or longevity, for short. Increased longevity is obviously good
news for the retirees. But unless all retirement income is annuitized,
increased longevity has a negative impact on living standards. It requires
a reduced rate of per-period consumption.
Efficient risk-sharing calls for a sharing of longevity risk with subsequent
generations. On a microeconomic level, annuities are the obvious risksharing tool, but they are subject to adverse selection and often unavailable. Most assets are held in nonannuitized form, which leads to substantial intergenerational transfers through accidental bequests. On an
aggregate level, longevity risk is virtually impossible to insure in the market.
Insurance providers are owned collectively by the generation that seeks
insurance. Insurance between nearby, but distinct cohorts would have to
be signed far in advance, before too much about actual longevity is known.
Therefore, the government has a unique role as a provider of longevity
insurance backed by future generations, providing a rationale for annuitized public pensions.
The degree of inefficiency without public pensions depends heavily on
retiree attitudes toward bequests. To the extent assets are bequeathed intentionally—say, to a close relative or to a favorite charity—there is no inefficiency.

26

Henning Bohn

To the extent that bequests occur because annuities are unavailable, public
pensions improve retiree welfare. I interpret the popularity of public pensions
as indication that most retirees like annuities (i.e. do not have altruistic
bequest motives strong enough to make the risk-sharing problem moot).
Not all annuitized public pensions share aggregate longevity risk. The
key design issue is if per-period pensions and related medical benefits are
fixed regardless of longevity (i.e. of the DB variety), or if payroll taxes and
other contributions are held constant (i.e. the DC model). In the former
case, increased longevity requires higher taxes. In the latter case, increased
aggregate longevity must lead to reduced per-period benefit payments.
Table 2-2B provides a quantitative perspective on how fiscal policy allocates
longevity risk. It shows responses to a permanent 15 percent increase
in longevity during retirement (equivalent to about two years). Under
laissez-faire, per-period retiree consumption declines one-for-one with longevity (see Columns 1 and 2). Because working-age cohorts also expect a
longer retirement, they increase savings and reduce consumption, but only
fractionally. Efficient risk-sharing simply calls for sharing current resources
(Column 3). Savings remain unchanged because the longevity increase is
permanent and leaves no scope for risk-sharing over time. The calibrated
allocation (Column 4) shares longevity risk better than laissez-faire due to
annuitized social security and health benefits, but not completely. An
expanded transfer system (Column 5) comes closer to risk-pooling, documenting the risk-sharing role of an annuitized DB model, whereas the DC
system (Column 6) is as inefficient as laissez-faire.
The retirement age is an open question in this context. One may of course
allow early retirement at an actuarially reduced pension. The deeper question is how the normal retirement age should relate to longevity. Medical
improvements that extend a generation’s ability to work may be viewed as a
positive demographic shock. Risk-sharing would then suggest that individuals capable of working longer should indeed work longer and share the
gains with other cohorts. The gains may be small, however, because if
retirement ages are individually optimal, working longer increases lifetime
income by about as much as it reduces utility from leisure, leaving no firstorder gains for sharing. A related issue is the baseline for insurance. Only
unexpected changes are insurable. If one started with naı̈ve static expectations, any increase in longevity would trigger payments from those living
short lives to those who have the financial misfortune of living longer.
Insurance against good news—living longer—is counterintuitive from a
distributional perspective. If insurance is conditioned on a positive trend
path for longevity, in contrast, only deviations from this path are insurable
and would trigger increased or reduced intergenerational transfers.
Conditioning on the trend is perhaps the best argument for linking
retirement age to longevity. It seems unfair to let generations who die
early pay for the predictably higher expenses of longer-living generations.

2 / Who Bears What Risk? Intergenerational Perspective

27

But to avoid slipping from a DB to a DC world, the normal retirement age
needs to be fixed well before a cohort approaches retirement. An exemplary implementation is the increase in retirement age from 65 to 67 in the
USA, which was announced decades in advance.
Finally, we note that tax distortions may impose limits on sharing demographic risks. Fertility and longevity risk are shared by imposing higher
working-age taxes on unexpectedly small cohorts and on cohorts that
follow unusually long-lived ones. It is an open question to what extent tax
distortions explain why demographic risk-sharing is incomplete in practice.
Distortions do provide another rationale for link normal retirement age to
the longevity trend.

Aggregate Risks (III): Health Care
The growth in medical expenses has reached a stage where health care
deserves treatment as a macroeconomic risk factor. The social security
debate has been remarkably silent about health issues, even though
Medicare and Medicaid are growing much more rapidly and—looking
forward—will impose the greater fiscal burden. It is tempting to avoid
discussing the issue, because health care raises delicate questions about
preferences over life, death, and human suffering. I will nonetheless attempt a welfare-theoretic analysis as policymakers simply cannot afford to
ignore the issue.
Two very different perspectives are currently influential in the health
care debate. One view is that every person is entitled to health and survival,
regardless of wealth or income. Under this view, public spending on health
care will grow at an exogenous rate, driven by an ethical obligation to pay
for all health care that is technically feasible. The economic implications of
this are troubling, with fiscal projections totaling $38 trillion in present
value for Medicare (Gokhale and Smetters 2003). Cost uncertainty creates
a huge need for insurance. The opposing view is that people buy health
care like other commodities; consequently, the demand for health services
responds elastically to changing relative prices and to rising income.
Growth in medical spending is thus endogenous, driven in part by technological innovations that reduce quality-adjusted prices, in part by rising
incomes, and in part by inefficient insurance arrangements that provide
false price signals. Insuring expenditures would then be misguided. The
insurable events are instead the discoveries of new treatments and the
resulting changes in relative prices. The need for insurance depends on
health consumers’ price elasticity. If innovations reduce the price of curing
a health problem, expenditures fall if demand is inelastic; stay constant if
demand has unit elasticity, or rise if demand is elastic. In practice, new
treatments tend to increase overall medical spending, suggesting that
demand is more than unit-elastic. Setting aside the well-known static
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inefficiencies of third-party insurance (a topic best left to microeconomics), the key macro implication is that rapid growth in medical spending
may well be an efficient response to medical innovations and price-elastic
demand.
These contrasting views have some common macroeconomic and intergenerational implications. Medical expenses are bound to increase as share
of GDP, either unavoidably (view 1) or because it is optimal (view 2). The
generational implications follow from the correlation between age and
medical needs: risk-sharing, of whatever type appropriate, will go in the
direction of working-age cohorts providing insurance to retirees.
The source of rising medical expenses is important for the distributional
baseline. Even if one takes an entitlement view of what society should cover,
one must acknowledge that growth in medical expenses is largely driven by
new treatments. Intergenerational insurance against health care cost is
thus analogous to longevity insurance. Just like longevity insurance, insurance against medical expenses insures against the financial implications of
good news—the discovery of new treatments. Just like longevity insurance,
such insurance is awkward from a distributional perspective. Why should
we be responsible for the medical expenses of future generations who we
expect to be more healthy, wealthy, and longer living than we are? The
fiscal balance rule of generational accounting appears questionable in this
context because it obliges current generations to share the cost of treatments not yet invented (Gokhale and Smetters’ $38 trillion estimate includes some amount of this).
Intergenerational risk-sharing is again about the impact of changes
relative to a given baseline, and it is applicable regardless of baseline. For
analytic purposes, I divide health care into two conceptually distinct types,
roughly corresponding to the two views. Type 1 consists of life-saving or lifelengthening treatments prerequisite for normal life (life-saving care, for
short). Type 2 consists of items that make people feel better, here called
discretionary care, for short. In the OG model, one may think of life-saving
care as affecting the probability of reaching a certain age, but not utility
from consumption conditional on survival, whereas Type 2 health care
enters into each period’s utility function. Risk-sharing with Type 1 medical
expenses is centrally about the value of life—an issue where normative
answers are outside the scope of economics. If, however, one takes a certain
level of life-saving care as given, and if such care enters separably into
individual preferences, efficient risk-sharing calls for the unexpected cost
to be shared. The usual principles of risk-sharing apply to the generations’
nonmedical consumption.
Efficient risk-sharing with Type 2 medical expenses is a straightforward
exercise in welfare analysis. Health care prices enter the price index
for consumption. Assuming discretionary care has a higher weight in
retiree consumption, an unexpected decline in quality-adjusted medical
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prices implies a decline in the price index of retiree consumption relative
to the price index of working-age consumption. If the elasticity of substitution between health care and other consumption is above one, as presumed in the discretionary view, then efficient risk-sharing calls for retirees
to share with working-age cohorts the welfare gains from lower medical
prices. Real consumption would increase for all cohorts, but consumption
spending would decline for retirees while rising for working-age cohorts.
Table 2-3 provides a quantitative illustration. The setting is the Diamond
model described above, now with a distinction between medical and nonmedical consumption. Retirees are assumed to have twice as much health
care needs as working-age cohorts.12 Columns 1 and 2 contrast two extreme scenarios, ‘Full Coverage’ of retiree medical expenses (the DB
approach) versus ‘Capped Benefits’ (the DC approach). Efficient risksharing is shown in Column 3. Consumption spending refers to total
consumption, including private- and government-provided health care,
with nonmedical consumption as numeraire. For reference, public spending
in the USA covers about 65 percent of retiree health care. As Medicare drug
coverage is rolled out, this percentage is likely to increase.
Panel A explores the implication of a permanent 30 percent increase in
medical needs, meaning an increase in expenses that is unavoidable and
separable in preferences from other consumption.13 The Full Coverage
scenario imposes the cost entirely on the next generation of taxpayers,
leaving nonmedical retiree consumption unchanged. The Capped Benefits
scenario holds overall retiree spending unchanged, forcing them to fund
the incremental medical expenses from reduced nonmedical spending.
Working-age households also face increased medical expenses, but their
response is mainly driven by their expectations about retirement. In the
Full Coverage scenario, savings and investment decline as workers pay
higher taxes to fund retiree medical expenses without having to worry
about increased own expenses in retirement. In the Capped Benefits
scenario, working-age savings and investment increase in expectation of
higher medical expenses in retirement.
The standard for efficient risk-sharing with separable preferences is an
equal response of nonmedical spending. In the setting of Table 2-3A, this
implies covering 27 percent of costs (Column 3), forcing retiree and
worker nonmedical consumption to decline. Efficiency also implies a
zero savings response because expenses increase equally in current and
future periods. The 27 percent value is sensitive to the example parameters.
The zero investment response is robust—a hallmark of an efficient response to a permanent shock.
Table 2-3B presents a setting where individuals have preferences with
constant elasticity of substitution over real medical and nonmedical consumption. Prices are assumed to decline by 30 percent, the elasticity equals
2, so medical expenses also increase by 30 percent. But now the increased
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Table 2-3 Uncertain Medical Spending: Needs-driven or Innovation-driven?
Scenarios (Responses to unexpected changes in percent)
Full coverage Capped benefits Efficient risk
for retirees for retirees
sharing
(1)
(2)
(3)
Panel 3A: Inelastic increase in medical needs
Consumption spending in retirement
Consumption spending in working age
Nonmedical Cons. in retirement
Nonmedical Cons. in working age
Disposable income in working age
Capital investment
Medical cost coverage

6.6
1.6
0.0
6.4
3.6
8.0
100

0.0
1.4
8.5
6.1
0.0
2.9
0

1.8
1.4
6.2
6.2
1.0
0.0
27

Panel 3B: Elastic response to medical innovations
Consumption spending in retirement
6.6
Consumption spending in working age
0.0
Nonmedical Cons. in retirement
0.0
Nonmedical Cons. in working age
3.9
Disposable income in working age
3.6
Capital investment
11.5
Medical cost coverage
100

0.0
0.5
6.6
3.4
0.0
1.2
0

0.7
0.6
7.4
3.4
0.4
0.0
11

Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: Panel A assumes medical expenses are inelastic/needs-driven and increase 30
percent. Panel B assumes a 30 percent decline in quality-adjusted health care prices
and an elastic response of medical consumption. Responses are computed for the
calibrated model with stylized US policy, as detailed in the text. Col. 1: Retiree medical
expenses are fully government funded on the margin. Col. 2: Retiree medical benefits
are held constant. Col. 3: Efficient risk-sharing.

spending reflects a relative price chance favorable to retirees. Full Coverage
(Column 1) raises retiree consumption, reduces working-age consumption
and capital investment as savers expect full health coverage in retirement.
Capped Benefits (Column 2) leaves retiree spending unchanged and
triggers an individually optimal shift from nonmedical to health care consumption. Workers also shift away from nonmedical to health care
consumption, and they reduce savings slightly because lower-cost health
care yields greater benefits in retirement than during working age.
Efficient risk-sharing (Column 3) now calls for retirees to share the positive effect of lower health care prices with working-age cohorts by accepting
reduced transfers. Retirement spending declines, nonmedical consumption
declines even more, whereas working-age income and consumption spending rise. The numerical values are again example specific, but the efficiency
of a benefit reduction and the zero investment response are robust. These
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results apply to any permanent price decline provided permanent retirees
consume relatively more health care than younger cohorts.

International Risks: Wars and Foreign Assets
Wars. The risk of war is a major risk omitted in the analysis earlier. This is
because burden-sharing is the standard paradigm of war financing, so risksharing does not provide much new insight. War expenses and war-related
damages are negative shocks to the national resource constraint. A draft
could be interpreted as a negative but temporary shock to working-age
productivity. In an overlapping generations setting, efficiency would call
for risk-pooling across generations. The results of a formal analysis would
presumably resemble Barro’s (1979) tax smoothing model.
However, the OG model gives different answers than that provided by
the representative agent literature solving Ramsey tax problems. In representative agent models, the risk of war is best shared instantaneously
through state-contingent claims (Lucas and Stokey 1983). In the OG
model, efficient risk-sharing includes future generations. Their contributions to war finance cannot be collected instantaneously and requires
taxation over time. State-contingent debt therefore does not avoid the
need for a dynamic fiscal response to wars and other temporary shocks.
Foreign Assets. Foreign assets are the focus of international risk-sharing,
as highlighted by Shiller (1993, 1999). He views international and
intergenerational risk-sharing as alternative insurance mechanisms, and
in his book (1993) he explains in some detail how international financial
markets would help share income risks. In the same spirit, one could
imagine macromarkets for country-specific fertility risks, longevity risks,
and health care risks.
Unfortunately, the macromarkets that Shiller envisions do not yet exist.
Today’s financial markets facilitate capital flows and permit the trading of
claims against capital income. For a quantitative perspective, note that the
US States capital stock is about 225 percent of GDP, net foreign liabilities
are about 25 percent of GDP, direct investments and equity holdings
abroad are 36 percent of GDP, and foreign direct and equity investment
into the USA total 43 percent of GDP (2003). Domestic residents thus
retain a 190 GDP-percent exposure to domestic asset valuation risk
(¼22636), almost equal to their 200 GDP-percent net wealth
(¼22525). The low ratio of foreign assets to net worth (43/200) suggests
that international assets are a smaller source of risk than any of the aggregate risks discussed earlier. While uncertainty about the return on foreign
assets is a source of risk that might be shared across generations, it is
unclear why international risk-sharing is so incomplete.
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Endogenous Growth
A promising area for future research is intergenerational risk-sharing in an
endogenous growth context, though most of the literature to date assumes
exogenous growth. It has been noted that intergenerational risk-sharing
could have much greater welfare benefits if it also affects economic growth.
For instance Obstfeld (1994) posits that individuals can choose between
low-risk, low-return and higher-risk, higher-return technologies. Under
autarchy, risk-averse individuals choose relatively low-return investments.
When risk are shared and thus reduced, individuals choose higher-return
investments, leading to an increase in the average rate of growth. Applied in
a multigenerational setting, the same argument would suggest that better
intergenerational risk-sharing may encourage savers to select higher-risk,
higher-return technologies, which would lead to an increase in average
growth rates. The Obstfeld model suggests that growth effects could magnify the gains from risk-sharing by an order of magnitude.

Conclusions
This chapter has examined the allocation of major aggregate risks from an
intergenerational perspective. Such risks cannot be eliminated by insurance, but they can be managed through risk-sharing. Government has a key
role in this endeavor, because it can oblige future generations to participate in risk-sharing arrangements. Many fiscal institutions and practices
can be interpreted as beneficial risk-sharing arrangements in this sense, but
intergenerational risk-sharing is far from perfect. More specifically, we have
reviewed risks related to productivity growth and to asset prices, demographic risks due to changes in fertility and longevity, and medical-expense
risks created by changing health care needs and by innovations in medical
technology.
With regard to macroeconomic risks, the message is to focus on productivity growth and not be distracted by uncertain asset values. Though
uncertain asset values are indeed a risk for retirement savers and other asset
holders, productivity growth is a much greater source of long run uncertainty. Fiscal institutions in the USA are well suited to provide safe claims to
retirees via social security and government bonds, and asset valuation risk is
shared via income taxes. Growth uncertainty has received comparatively
little attention. Compared to a benchmark allocation with perfect riskpooling, the retiree generation appears underexposed to productivity
risk, though still overexposed to asset valuation risk. With regard to babyboom and baby-bust phenomena, the key insight is that DB pensions and
other intergenerational transfers have an important risk-sharing function.
In an economy without such transfers, large cohorts are worse off than
small cohorts. A large cohort’s labor supply tends to depress wages and its
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supply of retirement savings tends to depress asset returns. DB pensions
impose relatively lighter burdens on larger cohorts and thereby help share
demographic risk.
Fiscal policy has a similar risk-sharing role with regard to longevity.
Longevity insurance is awkward from a distributional perspective, however.
To share the financial risk of longevity, cohorts suffering from low-life
expectancy have to make transfers to cohorts that enjoy a longer life. It is
important therefore to condition risk-share on a trend path of rising
longevity (e.g. by linking normal retirement to the longevity trend). If
one focuses on deviations from the trend, one finds that annuitized pensions with defined benefits help share longevity risk across generations.
Uncertain health care expenses create similarly awkward insurance problems as longevity. Full insurance against medical innovations (say, though
Medicare or Medicaid) mean that cohorts receiving relatively inferior care
would have to transfer resources to cohorts that benefit from medical
innovations. Such transfers would be implied, for example, by the fiscal
balance rule of generational accounting. Efficient risk-sharing does not
support full coverage for retirees’ unexpected medical needs. We address
this issue from two perspectives. One view is that medical needs are inelastic
and separable from other consumption. In this case, efficient risk-sharing
calls for the retiree generation’s unexpected medical needs to be financed,
in part, by taxes on future generations and, in part, by reduced nonmedical
consumption. A different view is that medical care may be seen as a substitutable component of normal consumption; in this case, increased expenditures would be seen as driven by declining quality-adjusted prices and more
than unit-elastic demand. In this case, efficient risk-sharing calls for the
retiree generation to self-finance the impact of unexpected medical innovations, even for intergenerational transfers to decline a little. These results
are, to reemphasize, macroeconomic and, therefore, disregard potentially
challenging issues of cross-sectional distribution. They nonetheless provide
a macroeconomic starting point for the design of health care policies.

Endnotes
1. Bernheim and Bagwell (1988) suggest an even stronger result: with intermarriage between dynasties, not even idiosyncratic risk would be an issue because
altruistically motivated transfers from more fortunate to less fortunate family
members would eliminate idiosyncratic risk. Barro’s and Bernheim and Bagwell’s papers specifically examine idiosyncratic taxes, but their insights apply
equally to family responses to other idiosyncratic shocks.
2. The model abstracts from overlap between work status and income types. Much
of the capital income during working age accrues in retirement funds or as
housing wealth that is rarely liquidated before retirement. The economics of
retirement savings is therefore not much distorted if one pretends that the
return on working-age savings accrues at the time of retirement.
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3. A temporary productivity shock would require a period of high growth to be
followed by an offsetting period of low growth—a somewhat implausible
scenario. Even then, consumption smoothing is insufficient under plausible
assumptions to correct the overexposure of working-age cohorts to productivity
risk (see Bohn (2004) for details).
4. Readers with a finance background may question this argument because upfront incentives imply a proportionally higher account balance at the individual
level. If invested entirely in equities, this implies the same risk-exposure as an
investment in an account without up-front incentives but tax-exempt earnings.
The equivalence is invalid at the aggregate level, however, because up-front
exemptions must be financed. Ceteris paribus, they imply a greater share of
government debt in capital markets and hence in the average retiree’s (enlarged) portfolio. On aggregate, savers must hold the capital stock and therefore cannot hold more equities in a system with up-front incentives than in a
system with after-tax saving.
5. This uses the preferred error-corrections specification that exploits the stationarity of the dividend yield and the dividends/GDP ratio.
6. It is an open question to what extent estimates for the S&P500 generalize to
other financial assets used for retirement savings. One may suspect that diversification into other asset classes would yield a lower valuation risk. The
results for the S&P500 provide at least a starting point for thinking about
long-run risks.
7. The main macroeconomic assumptions are a 30 percent capital share in production, an elasticity of intertemporal substitution of 0.5, a 25 percent share of
old capital in the total return on retirement savings, an inelastic labor supply, a
trend path with 1 percent annual population growth, 1.5 percent annual
productivity growth, a 4.5 percent real return on capital, and a length of the
retirement equal to one-third of work-life (15:45 years).
8. To be specific, bequests are modeled as ‘accidental’ due to stochastic mortality
and imperfect annuitization. The latter is discussed below in the section on
longevity risk.
9. See Bohn (1990), Shiller (1993), and Borensztein et al. (2005) for more
discussion of GDP indexing.
10. Because stochastic inflation would create new risks, the point of this caveat is
more to distinguish wage- and GDP-indexing from inflation-indexing than
argue for nominal debt.
11. Note that variable immigration would have the same impact on cohort size as a
variable fertility. The macroeconomic implications would be identical. My
interpretation focuses on fertility mainly to avoid questions about whose preferences count, for the welfare analysis.
12. The factor two is conservative, to avoid overstating the differences. The ratio
was 2.67 in 1999 for public and private health care expenses and about 5.7 for
government-funded care. The overall value is relevant for welfare calculations.
These ratios and the 65 percent coverage value below are computed from US
Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, National Health Care Expenditure Tables, online at http://
www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/historical downloaded 3/17/2005.
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13. This percentage is about halfway between the Social Security Administration’s
intermediate cost and high-cost estimates for Hospital Insurance in 2035. It may
be interpreted as standard deviation if one views the high- and low-cost estimates as 2-s confidence bands.
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